TRUTH, LIES, AND COPYRIGHT
Cathay Y. N. Smith
Fake news may be trending right now, but fake news is not the only source
of fake facts that we consume. We encounter fake facts every day in the historical
or biographical books we read, the movies we watch, the maps we study, the telephone directories and dictionaries we reference, and the religious or spiritual
guides we consult. While it is well-established that copyright does not protect
facts because facts are discovered rather than created, fake facts are created and
can often be as original and creative as fiction.
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of copyright protection of fake facts contained in fake news and other sources. It details the different
categories of fake facts we encounter today and courts’ inconsistent protection of
fake facts under copyright law. Even though copyright law may technically protect fake facts as original expression fixed in a tangible medium, this Article argues that the public interest in promoting efficiency, fairness, and production of
socially valuable works justify treating fake facts as unprotectable facts under
copyright law. Specifically, courts should apply copyright law’s factual estoppel
doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts in infringement cases where an
author previously held out fake facts as facts, with the intent that the public rely
on the fake facts as facts, if the public could believe the fake facts to be true.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................
I. FAKE FACTS ........................................................................................
II. COPYRIGHTING FACTS ........................................................................
III. THE INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHTING FAKE FACTS ..........
A. Fake Facts “Held Out as Facts” ................................................
1. Express Statements of Fact ...................................................
2. Implications of Fact ..............................................................
B. Defendant’s “Reasonable Reliance” ..........................................
1. Reasonable Reliance Required .............................................
2. Reasonable Reliance Not Required ......................................

202
204
211
213
214
215
218
221
221
222

 Associate Professor, University of Montana Blewett School of Law. I thank Bita Amani,
Michelle Bryan, Sarah Burstein, Carys Craig, Jesse Dodson, Tabrez Ebrahim, Roger Ford,
James Grimmelmann, Cynthia Ho, Camilla Hrdy, Dmitry Karshtedt, Jessica Kiser, Nicholson Price, Sarah Rajec, Ana Santos Rutschman, Zahr Said, and Andres Sawicki (special
thanks to Andres for the awesome title) for comments and discussions that helped me improve upon early ideas and drafts of this Article; thank you also to the organizers of and participants at the 2017 IPSC hosted by Cardozo Law and the 2019 JIPSA Winter Workshop
hosted by William & Mary Law. Finally, thank you to the diligent and thoughtful studenteditors at the Nevada Law Journal.

201

202

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

C. Fake Facts Protected as Fiction ................................................. 224
IV. JUSTIFYING FACTUAL ESTOPPEL ........................................................ 227
A. Benefits of Factual Estoppel ....................................................... 227
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Efficiency and
Production of Socially Valuable Works ................................ 227
2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Judicial
Efficiency .............................................................................. 228
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine May Marginally Deter
Creation of Fake Facts ......................................................... 229
4. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Is Fair ................................. 229
5. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Upholds Reasonable
Expectations.......................................................................... 230
B. Consequences of Factual Estoppel ............................................. 231
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could, Theoretically,
Increase Dissemination of Fake Facts.................................. 231
2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Negatively Affect
Production of Certain Genres of Works ............................... 232
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Deny Protection to
Original Arrangement or Expression of Fake Facts ............ 233
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE FACTUAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE.......... 234
A. The Author Held Out Fake Facts as Facts................................... 235
B. The Author Intended the Public to Rely on Fake Facts as
Facts............................................................................................ 236
C. The Public Could Believe that the Work is Factual ..................... 238
D. Balancing the Evidence Supporting Factual Estoppel................ 241
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 242

INTRODUCTION
Fake news. The Pizzagate conspiracy. Deep fakes. A Million Little Pieces.
Three Cups of Tea. In the Garden of Good and Evil. Found-footage films. The
Blair Witch Project. News satire. The Onion. The Borowitz Report. Paper
towns. Trap streets. Ghost words. Every day, we are assailed with fake facts.
Fake facts are fictions, created stories, or unverifiable illusions held out to the
public as true. These fake facts can include fake news stories, deep fakes, fictional embellishments in nonfiction works, fictitious entries in data and
knowledge repositories, unverifiable divine revelations or spiritual claims, and
outright lies. Some fake facts are held out as true in order to deceive or mislead
us. Some are held out to entertain us. Some fake facts are held out in order to
detect plagiarism. Other fake facts are held out as true in order to induce us to
believe. In spite of the recent media attention on fake news, fake news is not
the only source of fake facts circulated for public consumption. Fake facts have
long infiltrated our culture in the historical or biographical books we read, the
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movies we watch, the maps we study, the telephone directories and dictionaries
we reference, and the religious or spiritual guides we consult.
It is well-established that copyright law does not protect facts. Facts are
discovered rather than authored and, therefore, are not subject to copyright protection.1 Fake facts, however, are created and not discovered, and are often as
original and creative as fiction. Copyright law, technically, would protect these
fictions.2 In the past, a handful of courts have considered the copyrightability of
fake facts and have applied copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine to prevent
authors from claiming their works to be fiction and, therefore, entitled to higher
copyright protections after those authors previously held out the same works to
the public as nonfiction.3 Under the factual estoppel doctrine, these courts
treated the author’s fake facts as facts, granting them limited copyright protection.4 The first case in the United States to consider copyright of fake facts was
in 1913 when a journalist sued a playwright for copying the plot of the journalist’s fake news article.5 The court held that the plot of the fake news article was
not protected by copyright because it was previously held out as true.6 Since
then, courts have applied the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts in infringement cases involving fictional embellishments in
historical or biographical works, fictitious entries in telephone directories, fake
streets in maps or fake entries in encyclopedias, and claims of divine, extraterrestrial, or scientific revelations in spiritual and religious texts.7 Within those
limited decisions, however, courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply the
doctrine to treat fake facts as facts, or have been inconsistent in their application of the doctrine and uncertain when the doctrine should apply.8
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of copyright protection
of fake facts and discussion of copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine. It advocates for courts to consistently apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat
fake facts as unprotectable facts where the author held out fake facts as facts,
with the intent that the public rely on those fake facts as fact, and where the
public could believe that the fake facts were true. Part I details the different
categories of fake facts that pervade our society, including fake news and deep
fakes, fictional embellishments in biographical or historical works, fictitious
entries in factual compilations, and revelations in spiritual and religious works.
It is surprisingly common to find fake or embellished “facts” in works that we
1

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344–47 (1991) (“That there
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of
copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates’ ”) (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”).
3 See infra Part III.
4 See infra Part III.
5 Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
6 Id. at 55.
7 See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part III.
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typically rely on to be true. Part II explains why copyright law does not and
should not protect facts. Part III outlines courts’ inconsistent treatment of fake
facts under copyright law, including their failure or reluctance to treat fake
facts as facts and their conflicting requirements for applying the factual estoppel doctrine in copyright infringement cases. Part IV sets forth the reasons why
copyright should not protect fake facts and justifies the factual estoppel doctrine under the public’s interest in efficiency, fairness, and promotion of socially valuable works. While there are concerns that treating fake facts as unprotectable facts under copyright law could increase dissemination of fake facts
and discourage production of certain genres of works, on balance, the justifications for applying the factual estoppel doctrine outweigh the concerns. Finally,
Part V draws from other areas of the law, including false advertising, trademark
infringement, and classic equitable estoppel defenses, to recommend a new factual estoppel doctrine framework for courts and litigants to determine when
fake facts should be treated as unprotectable facts in copyright infringement
cases.
I.

FAKE FACTS

Recent media coverage has brought attention to the widespread problem of
fake news.9 Fake news is “intentionally and verifiably false” news stories that
“could mislead readers.”10 A recent study by Pew Research Center shows that
at least 23 percent of Americans have accidentally or intentionally shared fake
news,11 and Statista reports that 52 percent of respondents see fake news on social media websites at least once a day.12 The Pizzagate incident is just one infamous example of fake news that went viral.13 The Pizzagate incident began
with fake news articles linking then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton to an
alleged child-sex-trafficking ring operated from a pizzeria in Washington,
D.C.14 After this fake news went viral on the Internet, a man, believing the fake
9

See, e.g., David Graham, Some Real News About Fake News, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/fake-news-republicans-democrats/591
211/ [https://perma.cc/JFY8-S9CV]; Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up
News is a Critical Problem That Needs to be Fixed, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-pr
oblem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ [https://perma.cc/XC8K-WTR6].
10 Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,
31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 213 (2017).
11 Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES.
CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fakenews-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/3XJ7-EWHQ].
12 Amy Watson, Perceived Frequency of Online News Websites Reporting Fake News Stories in the United States as of March 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/649
234/fake-news-exposure-usa/ [https://perma.cc/9TUW-FG8G] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
13 See, e.g., Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 16,
2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/pizzagate-anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scan
dal-w511904 [https://perma.cc/GB2A-38Z7].
14 Spencer S. Hsu, ‘Pizzagate’ Gunman Says He Was Foolish, Reckless, Mistaken – and
Sorry, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
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news to be true, entered the pizzeria with a fully loaded AR 15 military-style
rifle, “a .38 handgun[,] and a folding knife15 . . . . He shot open a lock and
found cooking supplies. He whipped open another door and found [] fresh pizza dough. [He] did not find any captive children.”16 The Pizzagate story has
since been debunked as fake news by multiple media sources, but there are still
those who believe that it is true.17 The National Enquirer is another “news”
source that publishes “outrageous and sometimes fake news stories.”18 Some
even described it as being “the original fake news media outlet that profits by
selling fake news.”19 For instance, in 2015, the National Enquirer published an
article claiming that Hillary Clinton’s White House dreams were over because
she only had six months to live.20 An even more recent and troubling problem
involves deep fakes. Deep fakes are videos generated by deep-learning computer applications “that look strikingly real.”21 These fakes are so realistic that
an unaided observer would not be able to detect the fake.22 They operate
through machine-learning algorithms and facial-mapping software to scan multiple photos of a person and their facial features, or record that person making
different facial expressions, to generate “believable videos of people doing and
saying things they never did.”23 Deep fakes have already been used in abusive
ways to create fake sex videos featuring celebrities or other women.24 They
have also been created to feature public officials “saying or doing things they
have never said or done.”25 Authors of fake news or deep fakes have different
pizzagate-shooter-apologizes-in-handwritten-letter-for-his-mistakes-ahead-of-sentencing
/2017/06/13/f35126b6-5086-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html [https://perma.cc/TV5BZ
K6N].
15 See id.; see also Robb, supra note 13.
16 Robb, supra note 13.
17 Scott Bauer, Pizzagate is Real, Says Paul Ryan’s Challenger, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/14/paul-ryan-opponent-says-he-believespizzagate-conspiracy/ [https://perma.cc/9KAX-466Q].
18 National Enquirer, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/nationalenquirer/ [https://perma.cc/6AAC-ENZD] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019); see also Kathy Kiely,
Tabloid Newspapers Raise Ethical Eyebrows, but Social Media is Greater Worry for Democracy, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/12/19
/national-enquirer-tabloid-fake-news-democracy-social-media-trump-column/2354021002/[h
ttps://perma.cc/R48C-GMCR].
19 National Enquirer, supra note 18.
20 Id.
21 Hilke Schellmann, Deepfake Videos Are Getting Real and That’s a Problem, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deepfake-videos-are-ruining-lives-is-democ
racy-next-1539595787 [https://perma.cc/JHU8-2GW3].
22 Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security,
Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deep-fak
es-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy [https://perma.cc/3MS7-NLJA].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep Fakes Are Where Truth Goes
to Die, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/
deep-fakes-fake-news-truth [https://perma.cc/7C5E-BKES].
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incentives for creating them: some earn income through Internet search engine
advertising, others seek to influence national political debates or election results.26 In spite of the current increased attention on fake news and deep fakes,
these deceptions are not the only source of fake facts circulated for public consumption. In fact, fake news is not even a new phenomenon. For instance, in
1835, the New York Sun published a series of fake news articles about the discovery of life on the moon.27 In fact, the first published factual estoppel case in
the United States, discussed later in this Article, was a 1913 decision denying
copyright protection to the plot of a fake news article that detailed the (fake)
dramatic criminal trial of a pregnant woman and her lover.28
In addition to fake news and deep fakes, there are many other ways fake
facts infiltrate our society. For instance, authors of historical or nonfiction
works sometimes embellish their writings with fake facts in order to make their
works more interesting and marketable to the public. A few recent high-profile
cases involving this type of deception were James Frey’s bestselling book A
Million Little Pieces and Greg Mortenson’s popular book Three Cups of Tea:
One Man’s Mission to Fight Terrorism One School at a Time. Take Frey’s A
Million Little Pieces as an example. A Million Little Pieces was originally marketed as a memoir about the author’s painful recovery from substance abuse in
a rehabilitation treatment center.29 After making Oprah’s Book Club selection
in 2005, Frey’s book topped the New York Times Best Seller list for fifteen
consecutive weeks.30 Two years after publication of the book, The Smoking
Gun published A Million Little Lies, debunking many of the facts in Frey’s
book.31 Those fake facts included the amount of time Frey claimed he spent in
jail, the manner of his girlfriend’s death, details about an incident outside the
rehabilitation center, and accounts of Frey receiving a root canal without anesthesia.32 Similarly, Mortenson’s Three Cups of Tea was also on the New York
Times nonfiction bestseller list for three years and a popular reading assignment
for college students.33 Three Cups of Tea detailed the story of Mortenson’s hu26

Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 10, at 217.
Id. at 214; N.Y. ‘Sun’ Launches Six-Part Fake News Series, 1835, NEWSEUMED, https:
//newseumed.org/artifact/new-york-sun-launches-six-part-fake-news-series-1835/ [https:
//perma.cc/UB5L-F7CW] (last visited July 9, 2019).
28 Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
29 See A Million Little Pieces, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Million-Little-Pieces-Ja
mes-Frey/dp/0307276902 [https://perma.cc/Q8L3-HGJ6] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
30 Adam White, A Million Little Pieces: Without Mention of its Scandal, What is There Left
to Say About James Frey’s Addiction Opus?, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.
independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/a-million-little-pieces-movie-jamesfreyoprah-adaptation-memoir-a9085796.html [https://perma.cc/74JJ-Y777].
31 A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey’s Fiction Addiction, SMOKING GUN (Jan. 4,
2006), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/celebrity/million-little-lies [https://perma.
cc/SK2A-KV3V].
32 Edward Wyatt, Author is Kicked Out of Oprah Winfrey’s Book Club, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/27/books/27oprah.html [https://perma.cc/NF5R-8L
2J].
33
Three Cups of Tea, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Cups_of_Tea [https:
27
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manitarian efforts in reducing poverty and increasing educational opportunities
for girls in Pakistan and Afghanistan.34 Mortenson followed the success of
Three Cups of Tea with the book Stones Into Schools: Promoting Peace with
Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan.35 In 2011, Sixty Minutes reported on the fake facts in Mortenson’s books, claiming that “some of the most
touching and harrowing tales in Mortenson’s books appear to have been either
greatly exaggerated or made up out of whole cloth.”36 These fake facts included
Mortenson’s claim to have stumbled into the village of Korphe on his descent
from K2, where he promised to build the village a school, and his sensational
claim that he was captured by the Taliban.37 The inclusion of fake facts in nonfiction works is surprisingly common.38 Other noteworthy examples of this behavior are Louis Linton’s In Congo’s Shadow, a memoir about her volunteer
time in Zambia, where she claims that she cared for an HIV-positive orphan
and was forced to hide from murderous rebels.39 Her memoir has been heavily
criticized for being largely fake.40 Author John Berendt likely missed out on a
Pulitzer Prize for his blockbuster nonfiction book, Midnight in the Garden of

//perma.cc/J2JX-CGQV] (last visited July 6, 2019).
34 Bernadette Murphy, ‘Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in
Afghanistan and Pakistan’ by Greg Mortenson, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.la
times.com/style/la-et-book30-2009nov30-story.html [https://perma.cc/SVZ8-BPQ4].
35 See Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Stones-into-Schools-Promoting-Afghanistan
/dp/0670021156 [https://perma.cc/ZFC3-NRFP] (last visited July 8, 2019).
36 60 MINUTES, Questions Over Greg Mortenson’s Stories, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2011),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/questions-over-greg-mortensons-stories-19-04-2011/2/
[https://perma.cc/62UW-YPVY].
37 See id.; Ron Moreau & Sami Yousafzai, Mansur Khan Mahsud: Greg Mortenson is a Liar, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.thedailybeast.com/mansur-khan-mahsud-greg
-mortenson-is-a-liar [https://perma.cc/C9VY-ZSHF] (last updated July 13, 2017).
38 This Article is concerned with fake facts and not what other commentators have described
as fictional facts. “Fictional facts are the narrative building blocks with which an author constructs a work of fiction.” Matt Kellogg, The Problem of Fictional Facts: Idea, Expression,
and Copyright’s Balance Between Author Incentive and Public Interest, 58 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 549, 550 (2011). Specifically, fictional facts are fictions created in works held
out by authors as being fiction. The Harry Potter Lexicon is an example that illustrates the
difference between fictional facts and fake facts. Id. at 549–50. The Harry Potter Lexicon
was created by Steven Vander Ark, a Harry Potter fan, and included a detailed “index of every incident, character, spell, and object that appeared in the [Harry Potter] series.” Id. These
fictional details, which served as the narrative building blocks of the Harry Potter stories, are
“fictional facts.” Id. at 550. Fake facts, on the other hand, are fictions that are held out as being factual. Had the Harry Potter series been marketed and advertised as nonfiction, and the
public could believe it to be nonfiction, the details in the stories would be considered fake
facts. See id. at 551. For a detailed analysis of fictional facts, see Kellogg, supra.
39 Craig Silverman, People Are Calling Bullshit on This Woman’s Memoir About Her “Gap
Year in Africa,” BUZZFEED (July 4, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/people
-are-calling-bullshit-on-this-memoir [https://perma.cc/UQZ7-D27T].
40
Id.
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Good and Evil, when it was discovered that Berendt took too many liberties
with facts in his story.41
Another way we are exposed to fake facts is through authors who purposefully include fake facts in their works to catch others who copy their works. In
certain data-publishing industries, such as telephone directories, dictionaries,
charts and ratings, or mapmaking, it is common for authors to plant fake facts
in their works in order to detect plagiarism. For instance, publishers of telephone directories will often include a handful of fake names and numbers in
their directories so that they can detect when a competitor copies their entries.42
If another telephone directory also includes those fake entries, the original publisher assumes that the latter publisher copied the first without doing any independent research. Indeed, it was four such fake entries that led Rural Telephone
Company to accuse Feist Publications of copying its telephone directory, leading to the famous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Co., Inc.43 Dictionaries or encyclopedias will also sometimes
include made-up entries to detect and demonstrate plagiarism. For instance,
“[i]n 1977, Fred L. Worth wrote The Complete Unabridged Super Trivia Encyclopedia” which included the fake fact that the 1970s TV detective Columbo’s
first name was Philip.44 When the board game Trivial Pursuit included that
same fake fact in its popular game, Worth sued for copyright infringement.45
Similarly, The New Columbia Encyclopedia of 1975 included an entry for
“Mountweazel” with the biography for Lillian Virginia Mountweazel, a fake
person born in Bangs, Ohio in 1942.46 Mountweazel, described as “a fountain
designer turned photographer who was celebrated for a collection of photographs of rural American mailboxes titled ‘Flags Up![,]’ ” died “ ‘at 31 in an
explosion while on assignment for Combustibles magazine.’ ”47 Similarly, the
New Oxford American Dictionary included the made-up word “esquivalience”
in 2001 to protect the copyright of its new electronic version of the dictionary.48
It defined esquivalience as “the willful avoidance of one’s official responsibili-

41

Edward Wyatt, His Blockbuster on Shelves, He Tempts Fate with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
21, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/21/books/his-blockbuster-on-shelves-he-tem
pts-fate-with-fire.html [https://perma.cc/L39X-PCP9].
42 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
43 Id.
44 Blog: It’s a Fake!, PORTABLE PRESS (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.portablepress.com/bl
og/2013/08/its-a-fake-facts/ [https://perma.cc/HYK6-JU73] (citing to FRED L. WORTH, THE
COMPLETE UNABRIDGED SUPER TRIVIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1977)).
45 Tamar Lewin, Issues Pursued in Copyright Lawsuit Are Not Trivial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13,
1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/13/us/issues-pursued-in-copyright-lawsuit-are-nottrivial.html [https://perma.cc/QT8M-5CRD].
46 Henry Alford, Not a Word, NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2005), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2005/08/29/not-a-word [https://perma.cc/U9TC-YLRM]; see also Bryan A. Garner, A Legal Lexicographer Looks at Law Reviews, 16 GREEN BAG 281, 284 (2013).
47 Alford, supra note 46.
48
Id.
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ties.”49 It is also common for mapmakers to include one or two fake towns or
streets, commonly known as paper towns or trap streets, in their maps in order
to catch others who plagiarize their maps.50 These paper towns or trap streets
do not exist in reality, but only on the mapmaker’s map. If another map were to
include these trap streets or paper towns, the original mapmaker would know
that its map had been copied. This strategy, however, has not always been successful. Agloe, New York, for instance, was a paper town that General Drafting
included in its roadmap of New York State in the 1930s.51 At that time, the director of General Drafting Otto G. Lindberg and his assistant Ernest Alpers
created the name “Agloe” for their fake town by mixing the first letters in their
names: OGL with EA.52 The town did not exist in reality but was included in
their map of New York to detect plagiarism.53 A few years later, Rand McNally
published a map of New York which included the town Agloe, New York.54
General Drafting accused Rand McNally of copying its map; however, Rand
McNally successfully defended itself by showing that the town actually existed.55 There was indeed an Agloe General Store located at the precise location
of General Drafting’s “Agloe.”56 This was, however, not an incredible coincidence; the owners of the general store chose the name after seeing the fake
town on General Drafting’s map.57
The final category of fake facts is those created to entertain, including
works such as found footage films, news satire or fictional news tabloids, and
historical fiction. Authors of these fake facts hold out their works as being true
in order to entertain their readers or audiences. Sometimes it is obvious that
these works are fake, but other times it is less clear, and the public may be
duped into believing that the facts or events described in these works are true.
For instance, The Blair Witch Project was a popular 1999 horror found-footage
film about three film students who, while making a documentary about the supernatural legend the Blair Witch, “disappear[ed] into the Black Hills with their

49

Garner, supra note 46, at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Is Esquivalience Now a Bona Fide Word?, ENG. LANGUAGE & USAGE, https://english.stackexchange.
com/questions/87063/is-esquivalience-now-a-bona-fide-word [https://perma.cc/3PCR-JGH
W] (last visited June 24, 2019).
50 MARK MONMONIER, HOW TO LIE WITH MAPS 51 (2d ed. 1991).
51 Robert Krulwich, An Imaginary Town Becomes Real, Then Not. True Story, NPR (Mar.
18, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2014/03/18/290236647/an-imaginary-to
wn-becomes-real-then-not-true-story [https://perma.cc/ET7W-ZZX7]; see also Laura Moss,
‘Paper towns’ and Other Lies Maps Tell You, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://www.mnn.com/lifestyle/arts-culture/stories/paper-towns-and-other-lies-maps-tell-you
[https://perma.cc/J23T-KS36].
52 Krulwich, supra note 51.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57
Id.
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recording equipment.”58 The producers of the film marketed the movie as a true
story, supporting their claim with fake police reports, newsreel-style interviews,
photographs, diary entries on the movie’s website,59 false claims that the students were “missing and assumed dead” on websites such as IMDb, and missing-persons posters for the three actors.60 Orson Wells’s War of the Worlds radio show from 1938 is an older example of the public being duped into
believing entertaining fake facts. On October 30, 1938, Columbia Broadcasting
System broadcasted Orson Wells and a group of actors reading a dramatic
script, adapted from H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds, about aliens from Mars
invading earth.61 Many listeners who had tuned into the radio broadcast believed that the invasion from Mars was real and shared the news with others,
creating a nationwide panic.62 Families fled their homes to nearby parks and
some rushed out of their houses with wet cloths over their faces to flee from
what they thought was an alien gas raid.63 Thousands throughout the nation
called the police and media seeking advice on how to protect themselves
against the aliens.64 Sometimes, even works that most people know are satire,
fake, or even absurd have caused confusion. For instance, the Weekly World
News publishes outlandish stories featuring supernatural or paranormal themes
that are largely fictional.65 These themes include discovering Bat Boy in a cave
in West Virginia and reporting on his adventures and shenanigans; the ALIVE!
series where dead celebrities are believed to have reemerged; and sightings of
mummies, prehistoric monsters, Santa Clause, aliens, merfolk, and cryptids.66
Similarly, the Onion publishes satirical news articles on international, national,

58

Neil Davidson, The Blair Witch Project: The Best Viral Marketing Campaign of All Time,
MWP (Aug. 5, 2013), http://mwpdigitalmedia.com/blog/the-blair-witch-project-the-best-v
iral-marketing-campaign-of-all-time/ [https://perma.cc/9FA6-NURT].
59 Rebecca Hawkes, Why Did the World Think the Blair Witch Project Really Happened?,
TELEGRAPH (July 25, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/2016/07/25/why-did-theworld-think-the-blair-witch-project-really-happened/ [https://perma.cc/KT4G-2G77]; Bernard Weinraub, ‘Blair Witch’ Proclaimed First Internet Movie, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 1999),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-08-17/features/9908170065_1_mark-curcio-amirmalin-artisan-entertainment [https://perma.cc/MRX4-MKMT].
60 Nextmovie Staff, The 12 Ballsiest Movie Publicity Stunts, MTV (July 24, 2013),
http://www.mtv.com/news/2816554/best-movie-publicity-stunts/ [https://perma.cc/26CD-4Q
5K] (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 HADLEY CANTRIL, THE INVASION FROM MARS: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PANIC
WITH THE COMPLETE SCRIPT OF THE FAMOUS ORSON WELLES BROADCAST 3 (1940).
62 Id.
63 Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.war-of-the
-worlds.org/Radio/Newspapers/Oct31/NYT.html [https://perma.cc/Y2V5-VSHY] (last visited June 24, 2019).
64 Id.
65 Exactly what is Satire? Here’s an Answer if You’re Not Too Demanding, NEUTRAL
GROUND NEWS, https://neutralgroundnews.com/satire-explained/ [https://perma.cc/3VSF-7L
JZ].
66 See Weekly World News, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekly_World_News
[https://perma.cc/89UW-KTA8] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
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and local issues.67 Even though its publications are formatted to appear like
mainstream news articles with headlines, articles, and photographs,68 most
readers are aware that the Onion’s news articles are satire and meant to entertain. Regardless, there have been a number of embarrassing public instances
where other news media or prominent persons have believed Weekly World
News and the Onion’s articles to be true.69
Fake facts are continuously and, by some accounts, increasingly circulated
for public consumption. These fake facts are held out as true to either deceive
or mislead us, induce us to believe, detect plagiarism, or to entertain us. How
does copyright law deal with these fake facts and how should it? Should copyright law protect the fake facts described above, should it protect certain categories of fake facts, or should copyright law exclude fake facts from its protectable subject matter under the factual estoppel doctrine? With advanced digital
technology, the rise of fake news and deep fakes, and increased and viral peersharing on social media, it is becoming harder to divine fake facts from facts
and easier for individuals to share fake facts with the world. In light of the recent focus on the issues of fake news and deep fakes by the media and our society’s appreciation of new forms of entertainment such as news satire, foundfootage films, and nonfiction novels, this Article provides a timely analysis of
copyright law’s treatment of fake facts.
II. COPYRIGHTING FACTS
Copyright law does not protect facts.70 Facts are discovered rather than authored and, therefore, do not meet copyright’s originality standard. Specifically,
copyright law only protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium.71 In order to meet copyright’s originality standard, a work must be independently created and exhibit a modicum of creativity.72 While this standard
is low, courts have almost consistently held that facts do not meet copyright’s
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Don’t Get Fooled by These Fake News Sites, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/pic
tures/dont-get-fooled-by-these-fake-news-sites/17/ [https://perma.cc/VL4M-554M] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
68 See id.
69 See, e.g., Andrew Blankstein, ‘Fox and Friends’ Falls for Ruse Alleging Purchase of $1
Billion of Jetpacks for LAPD, Fire Department, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), https://Latimes
blogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/10/fox-and-friends-falls-for-ruse-alleging-purchase-ofbillion-dollars-of-jetpacks-for-lapd-la-fire.html [https://perma.cc/PY2T-7NX3]; Kevin Fallon, Fooled by ‘The Onion’: 9 Most Embarrassing Fails, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 27, 2012),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/fooled-by-the-onion-9-most-embarrassing-fails [https://per
ma.cc/75FX-Q8A8] (some of those instances involved elected officials or popular news
journals believing headlines that “Planned Parenthood . . . [opens] $8 billion Abortionplex”
or that “Frustrated Obama Sends Nation Rambling 75,000-Word E[-]Mail”) (updated July
14, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 17 USC § 102(b) (2018).
71 Id. § 102(a).
72
See id.
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originality requirement because they are not created and involve no creativity.73
A fact does not originate with the author of a book that discovers or describes a
fact; “[t]he discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the facts
are ‘original’ with him.”74
Imagine a world where facts can be protected by copyright. This would allow the first person who discovers or describes a fact to exclusively control that
fact and control when and how that fact is shared with the public. Rather than
promoting “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts”75 by increasing our understanding and knowledge of the world, protecting facts under copyright
would steal away the “basic building blocks of public discourse,” impede progress, and harm society more than the copyright balance contemplates.76 Protecting facts under copyright law could eliminate the freedom to discuss, recast,
rethink, transform, joke about, and change how facts are presented and used,
which influences the public’s thoughts and views.77 It would allow private censors to hinder their critics and impede accurate, contrary, or entertaining discussions.78 As one commentator explained,
‘the freedom of access to facts and ideas is the history of democracy’; such freedom has promoted theories about freedom of speech, the marketplace of ideas,
and invigorated democratic dialogue . . . [both] copyright law and . . . the First
Amendment . . . accept that some information must remain freely accessible and
usable by all.79

Therefore, most scholars and courts agree that copyright law should not protect
facts.80 Even though facts are not protected, an original arrangement of those
facts, or the way an author expresses those facts, could be subject to copyright
protection.81 For instance, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enterprises, the Court held that President Ford could not prevent anyone from copying facts from his autobiography, but that he could prevent others from copying
his expression of facts, such as his “subjective descriptions and portraits of
public figures.”82 Nevertheless, copyright protection of original arrangements
73

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting 1 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[E], at 2–34 (1980)).
75 U.S. Const. art. VIII, § 8, cl. 8.
76 Robert Denicola, News on the Internet, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 68,
78–79 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact:
From Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95 (1992).
77 Gordon, supra note 76, at 101.
78 Id. at 100.
79 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299,
315 (1991).
80 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344–48 (1991);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the
Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 445, 450–51 (2001); see also cases Michael Steven
Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 921 n.8, 921 n.9, 923 n.13 (2003).
81 Feist Publ’ns., Inc., 499 U.S. at 348.
82
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 563–64.
74
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or expressions of facts is thin.83 Absent wholesale verbatim copying of an author’s expression of facts, infringement claims involving copying of factual
works are rarely successful.84
Fake facts, on the other hand, are created and not discovered, and can often
be as original and creative as fiction. Technically, fake facts would meet copyright’s originality requirement by being independently created and embodying
more than a modicum of creativity. The only barrier to copyright protection for
fake facts is copyright law’s factual estoppel doctrine. The factual estoppel doctrine is a judicial doctrine that treats fake facts as unprotectable facts in infringement cases if the author previously held out those fake facts to the public
as true.85 In other words, if authors claim that a story, theory, or cosmology is a
fact, they are factually estopped from changing their position in copyright infringement litigation in order to benefit from the higher protection afforded to
fictional creative works. As one commentator explained: “[i]f it is a fact, it is
not protected by copyright; if it is protected by copyright, then it can’t be a fact.
You can’t have it both ways, and courts will hold you to your original representation.”86 The factual estoppel doctrine, however, has not been widely accepted.
Some courts, as described below, fail to recognize or refuse to apply the doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts.87 Even courts that have considered the doctrine are split on what it means for an author to “hold out” their
work as true, whether the doctrine should apply when there is no reasonable reliance on the part of the defendant, and whether the doctrine is most concerned
with punishing an author’s bad behavior or with protecting a defendant’s reasonable reliance.88
III. THE INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHTING FAKE FACTS
In the early 1900s, journalist Action Davies sued the writer and producer of
the Broadway-play Kindling for copyright infringement.89 Davies alleged that
Kindling, written by playwright Charles Kenyon and produced by radiopersonality Edward Bowes, infringed a newspaper article Davies wrote and
published in the Evening Sun.90 Even though Davies had published his news
article in the Evening Sun as a “real life drama,” he claimed in litigation that it
was actually fiction.91 Because his news article was fake news, Davies argued
in his claim against Bowes that the fake news article deserved the same level of

83

1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[D] (2016).
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980).
85 Some courts and scholars refer to the factual estoppel doctrine as “copyright estoppel.”
See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83 § 2.11[C] n.68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 3 UTAH L. REV. 587, 595 (2007).
87 See infra Part III.
88 See infra Part III.
89 Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
90 Id.
91
Id. at 54–55.
84
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copyright protection as fiction.92 The court disagreed. In Davies v. Bowes, the
court held that because Davies had published his article as news and the defendants relied on the article as news, Davies was factually estopped from
claiming his article deserved the higher level of copyright protection afforded
to fiction.93 This was the first reported case in the U.S. to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to deny copyright protection to fake facts held out by the author
as true.
Since that first decision in 1913, a handful of courts have applied the factual estoppel doctrine to deny copyright protection to fake news, fake facts and
events in historical and biographical works, fake entries in phone books and
maps, and claims of spiritual or divine experiences and revelations.94 At the
same time, there are cases where courts failed to recognize or refused to apply
the factual estoppel doctrine and, instead, found fake facts to be as protectable
as fiction.95 This Part explores the inconsistent and conflicting applications of
the factual estoppel doctrine, and the main considerations courts use to determine whether and when the factual estoppel doctrine should apply to treat fake
facts as unprotectable facts. As evidenced in the cases below, copyright’s protection of fake facts and the factual estoppel doctrine remain under-theorized
and under-explained areas of copyright law.
A. Fake Facts “Held Out as Facts”
To determine whether copyright should protect fake facts, or if the factual
estoppel doctrine should treat fake facts as unprotectable facts, a key question
is whether the author held out fake facts as facts. If an author did not hold out
fake facts as facts, then those fake facts should generally be protected as fiction. If the author did hold out fake facts as facts, then the factual estoppel doctrine should probably apply to exclude those fake facts from copyright protection. Indeed, according to one court, the determination of whether the work was
presented to the public as factual is the “single, dispositive determination” to
applying the factual estoppel doctrine.96 In spite of its importance, “[c]ase law
has not established the standard for determining whether plaintiff held the
[work] out as fact [or] fiction,” and courts have been inconsistent in their determination of when fake facts are “held out as” true.97 For instance, what must
an author do to “hold out” fake facts as facts? In some cases, an author’s express statements that the work was entirely factual have invoked the factual estoppel doctrine.98 In other cases, the mere inclusion of fake facts in a source

92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 55.
See id.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.C.
Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 31 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
Id. at 28.
See infra Section III.A.1.
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most people would believe to be true has triggered the factual estoppel doctrine.99
1. Express Statements of Fact
In situations where authors make express statements that their work is factual, courts have generally found the factual estoppel doctrine to apply and
treated fake facts in the authors’ works as unprotectable facts. In Mosley v. Follett, the court found the author to have held out his work to the public as true
where he made several express representations that his work was factual.100 In
Mosley, the author wrote the book The Cat and the Mice based on the activities
of the German spy John Eppler but added a number of fictional characters and
incidents in his book.101 The author made a number of representations that The
Cat and the Mice was factual, including statements in the book’s introduction
that “[m]ost foreign correspondents . . . eventually came home with half a dozen fantastic and yet true spy stories . . . . I was no exception,” and that the stories in the book involved the author’s “own investigations.”102 The Cat and the
Mice book jacket proclaimed the book to be “a true, unbelievably exciting spy
story” and “[a] fascinating story that is fact, but that reads with the pace and
suspense of the best fiction.”103 The book was written in “[t]he ‘first person’
style in which [the author] inserts his own editorial comments as an actual observer” and included a series of “real life photographs.”104 The defendant relied
on The Cat and the Mice to write his own fictional work.105 When the author
sued the defendant for infringing his copyright to the fictional characters and
incidents he added in The Cat and the Mice, the court found that the author had
held out his work to the public as true, and applied the factual estoppel doctrine
to treat those fake facts as unprotectable facts.106
Similarly, in Marshall v. Yates, the author, William Arnold, wrote the book
Shadowland relaying the life story of Frances Farmer, “an actress and political
activist who was prominent . . . in the 1930s and 1940s.”107 After being recognized as a Hollywood rising star with a brilliant future ahead of her, Frances
Farmer was locked up in a state insane asylum and her name erased from Hollywood’s roster, ending her fame abruptly.108 With the exception of eight fake
99

See infra Section III.A.2.
Mosley v. Follett, No. 80 Civ. 5628, 1980 WL 1171, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1980).
101 Id. at *1.
102 Id. at *3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id.
105 See id. at *1.
106 Id. at *4 n.13.
107 Marshall v. Yates, No. CV-81-1850-MML, 1983 WL 1148, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
1983).
108 Elisabeth Sherman, The Rise and Fall (and Rise Again) of Frances Farmer, ATI (July
21, 2016), https://allthatsinteresting.com/frances-farmer-lobotomy [https://perma.cc/NF5UH7ZC].
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facts, Arnold’s Shadowland was largely biographical.109 When the defendant
produced a film about Farmer’s life and incorporated facts from Arnold’s
Shadowland, Arnold sued the defendant alleging that his film infringed Arnold’s copyright in Shadowland.110 In its decision, the court found Arnold to
have presented his book as nonfiction, including presenting the fake facts in his
book as facts, where “[t]he book itself purports to be a true story. It was released to the public as a non-fiction work. All of the promotional materials and
reviews of the book treated it as nonfiction.”111 In Houts v. Universal City Studios, the court came to the same conclusion when the author’s book Where
Death Delights included statements that the story was “one of the most absorbing books on true crime ever published and truth can be more brutal than fiction,” and indicated on the spine of the paperback edition of the book that it
was “N-F,” non-fiction.112
In Oliver v. Saint Germain Foundation, Frederick Spencer Oliver authored
a book titled A Dweller of Two Planets, which was dictated to him by the spirit
of a dead man, a “superior spiritual being.”113 In the book, Oliver dedicated at
least six pages to convincing his readers that the spiritual-being, Phylos, dictated the story to him and that the story was factual.114 These statements included
the preface stating that “the following book . . . is absolute revelation; that I do
not believe myself its Author, but that one of those mysterious persons . . . an
adept of the arcane and occult in the universe . . . is the Author. Such is the fact.
The book was revealed to me.”115 According to the Oliver court, Oliver held
out his work to the public as true in order to “induce those who might read to
believe that it was dictated by a superior spiritual being” and to “give the book
an origin similar to that claimed by the followers of Joseph Smith in the Book
of Mormons, the Koran by the followers of Mohammed.”116 The court applied
the factual estoppel doctrine to treat the revelations in A Dweller of Two Planets as unprotectable facts, even though the court admitted that a reasonable
reader might not believe the work was factual.117
In Silva v. MacLaine, Silva wrote the book Date with the Gods detailing
his experience meeting an extraterrestrial woman in Peru.118 The book included
the extraterrestrial’s explanations about UFOs, astral projection (out of body
travel while attached by a silver chain), and other divine experiences.119 The
109

Marshall, 1983 WL 1148 at *2.
Id. at *1.
111 Id. at *2.
112 Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 28–29 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
113 Oliver v. Saint Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 298–99 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
114 Id. at 297.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 299.
117 Id. (stating “[t]he law deals with realities and does not recognize communication with
and the conveyances of legal rights by the spiritual world as the basis for its judgment.”).
118 Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F. Supp. 1423, 1425 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
119
Id.
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defendant, MacLaine, published the book Out On A Limb, in which MacLaine
discusses a trip she took with Silva to Peru where they both met up with the
same extraterrestrial woman.120 MacLaine’s book describes her experiences in
Peru and her own astral projection.121 Silva sued MacLaine for infringing Date
with the Gods.122 Ruling for MacLaine, the court explained,
Silva seems intent on relating his experience at meeting an extraterrestrial who,
in this [litigation], he for the first time declares is a literary device and was not
real. The clear implication of the book is that he actually met an extraterrestrial
and is conveying her teachings to his readers.123

In Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, the court found enough evidence that the author held out his work as being true when he claimed to have “discovered” human ego fixations that “are based upon our proven scientific knowledge,” and
that the entire ego fixation system described in his book was “scientific, provable in the laboratory and clinically” and is “a discovery as scientific discoveries
are, with exactly the same qualification of being verifiable and objective.”124
Finally, in Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the defendant used
the author Stuart N. Lake’s book Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshall to produce a
radio show.125 Wyatt Earp was an American frontier lawman, saloonkeeper,
gambler, miner, and bouncer who was known as Old West’s “toughest and
deadliest gunman” of his day.126 Lake’s best-selling book was adapted into a
number of movies and television shows.127 In Lake, the court found Lake to
have held out his story of Wyatt Earp to be true where the author declared in
the book’s preface that the book was “an accurate historical biography based on
a factual account of Wyatt Earp’s career and ‘in no part a mythic tale.’ ”128 The
court found Lake to have held out his book as true even though most people
recognize that “an element of fictionalization in recounting the life of a great
western hero is almost de rigueur.”129 Lake later admitted that many of the
quotes by Wyatt Earp in his book were fake, and the book today is considered
largely fictional.130

120

Id. at 1426.
Id.
122 Id. at 1424.
123 Id. at 1430.
124 Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting OSCAR ICHAZO,
LETTERS TO THE SCHOOL 9 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125 Lake v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 707, 708 (S.D. Cal 1956).
126 Wyatt Earp, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wyatt_Earp [https://perma.cc/83
GB-PSF8] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
127 Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshal, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wyatt_Earp:
_Frontier_Marshal [https://perma.cc/XUL6-GH7A] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
128 Lake, 140 F. Supp. at 708.
129 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83, § 2.11[C].
130
Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshal, supra note 127.
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Implications of Fact

The cases above seem to demonstrate that, where authors expressly state
that the fake facts in their works are true, courts have generally found them to
have “held out” their work to the public as true.131 But absent an express statement of facts, some courts have found that implied representations of fact by
authors can also lead to findings that they held out their works as true. These
implications can be from the genre or style of the work or even where and how
the fake facts were published. For instance, in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., the court found the stories in the book Test Pilot to be held out as
true where Collins’s wife published a collection of “flying stories or air stories”
written by her test-pilot-late husband.132 These short stories recounted the test
pilot’s childhood, school, and “vivid descriptions of many of his own flights
. . . his more spectacular test dives” and “his own prophetic account of his last
test dive, concluding with the words ‘I am dead now.’ ”133 When Collins’s wife
sued Metro-Goldwyn for infringing her husband’s stories in Metro-Goldwyn’s
motion picture Test Pilot, the court applied the factual estoppel doctrine to find
the stories not protected by copyright because “[i]t is . . . apparent from the
very nature of Collins’[s] articles that they are largely a recitation of actual
facts.”134 The court even refused to find copyright infringement where the defendant recreated a death scene in its motion picture based on the pilot’s prophecy of his own death.135
Similarly, in the 1913 Davies v. Bowes case mentioned above, Davies
wrote “[a] Massachusetts real life drama which eclipses the plot of ‘The
Thief’ ” under the News of the Theater column for the Evening Sun.136 Davies
“cast [the story] in the form of an actual occurrence because he thought it more
striking.”137 Even though the short story did not include statements expressly
claiming to be true, the court found Davies to have held out the story as true
“because [][the story] was printed as news; it was presented to the public as
matter of fact and not of fiction; the readers of the Sun were invited to believe
it.”138 Davies might have claimed that he held out the work as true intending to
entertain his readers, but the court ascribed Davies’s action to “attracting attention and lending interest to an alleged occurrence which if told as fiction would
have been tawdry and unconvincing.”139

131

See supra Section III.A.1.
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissal of plaintiff’s unfair competition claim reversed on
appeal by Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939)).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 783.
135 Id.
136 Davies v. Bowes, 209 F. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
137 Id. at 55.
138 Id.
139
Id. at 56.
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In other cases, courts have assumed fake facts were held out as facts merely because they were published in sources that most readers would believe to be
factual instead of fiction, such as a telephone book, encyclopedia, test preparation text, or map. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. involved fake names and telephone listings in a phone book.140 In Feist Publications, Inc., Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement when Feist copied
Rural’s telephone directory.141 Rural was the sole provider of telephone service
in its service area and published a telephone directory of the names and phone
numbers for its service area.142 Feist published larger area-wide telephone directories and paid regional telephone companies like Rural to obtain white pages listings.143 After Rural refused to license its listings to Feist, Feist went
ahead and copied Rural’s white pages, listing the names and telephone numbers
of all of Rural’s subscribers.144 Rural discovered Feist’s copying when the latter’s telephone directory included four “fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect copying.”145 While recognizing that facts are not
copyrightable, the Court’s decision failed to address Rural’s four fake listings.
Instead, the Court found all of Rural’s telephone listings—the actual listings as
well as the four fake listings—to be unprotectable facts.146 The Court’s decision
to ignore Rural’s four fake listings, and to analyze them no differently than actual listings, implicitly applied the factual estoppel doctrine.147
Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co. involved fake facts in an encyclopedia.148
Fred L. Worth spent over six years researching and eventually publishing two
encyclopedias on trivia in 1977 and 1981.149 The creators of the popular board
game Trivial Pursuit relied on Worth’s encyclopedias to create up to 27.9 percent of the questions and answers in three game editions.150 Trivial Pursuit copied facts from Worth’s encyclopedias as well as at least one fake fact that
Worth had included in his encyclopedia to detect copying.151 Specifically,
Worth included the fake fact that the 1970s TV detective Columbo’s first name
was Philip.152 When Trivial Pursuit included a card revealing that Columbo’s
140

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
Id.
142 Id. at 342–43.
143 Id. at 343.
144 Id. at 343–44.
145 Id. at 344.
146 See id. at 345.
147 See Kellogg, supra note 38, at 562 (stating “[t]he Supreme Court relied on factual estoppel, if tacitly, when it analyzed four ‘fictitious’ phone numbers in Feist no differently than it
did the thousands of actual phone numbers at issue.”).
148 See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 569–70 (9th Cir. 1987).
149 Id.; see also Tamar Lewin, Issues Pursued in Copyright Lawsuit Are Not Trivial, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/13/us/issues-pursued-in-copyri
ght-lawsuit-are-not-trivial.html [https://perma.cc/9SLB-DLEP].
150 Worth, 827 F.2d at 570.
151 See It’s a Fake!, supra note 44.
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Id.
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first name was Philip, Worth sued for copyright infringement.153 In upholding
the lower court’s dismissal of Worth’s infringement claim, the court affirmed
that Trivial Pursuit’s “use of the factual content in Worth’s books does not constitute infringement.”154 The court even went as far as explaining that “[t]he
verbatim repetition of certain words in order to use the nonprotectible facts is
also noninfringing . . . ‘indispensable expression’ of particular facts or ideas.”155 Like the decision in Feist, the court’s opinion never addressed Trivial
Pursuit’s copying of Worth’s fake fact, thereby treating that fake fact as an unprotectable fact.
The court in Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co. took the same
approach when it was faced with an author’s assertion of “common errors of
fact appearing in both [the author’s and the defendant’s] books.”156 The author
and the defendant were both publishers of history outlines and other condensed
books on history for students and teachers.157 The court explained that the
common errors of fact appearing in the author’s Visualized American History
and the defendant’s Visualized Units in American History “only served to show
[defendant’s] use of the plaintiff’s book and not necessarily that what they
wrote infringed the copyright, for historical facts are not copyrightable per se
nor are errors in fact.”158 A similar result occurred in Nester’s Map & Guide
Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., where the court found the mapmaker to have held
out the “obscure and erroneous” street and building listings in its street guide
and map to be true merely because those fake facts were included in a publication titled “Official New York Taxi Driver’s Guide.”159
Whether an author held out fake facts as facts is one of the most important
considerations when deciding whether to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to
treat fake facts as unprotectable facts. However, prior case law provides no
clear guidance to courts, litigants, authors, or the creative industry on how to
determine whether authors held out their works to the public as true, how clear
authors must be about the fictionalized elements in their largely nonfiction
work, and whether defendants can rely on authors’ implied representations that
their works are factual. This lack of clarity can be harmful to authors that fictitiously hold out their works as fiction in order to entertain, such as works of
historical fiction, found-footage films, or satire news. If there is no guidance on
what constitutes holding out a work as factual, it is possible that the novel marketing of The Blair Witch Project could subject the movie to the factual estoppel doctrine, the Onion’s style of satirical news could render its articles unprotectable by copyright law, or works such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock
153
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Holmes stories—which are presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson—
could be treated as unprotectable facts because they were held out as true.
B. Defendant’s “Reasonable Reliance”
An area of even greater conflict in factual estoppel case law is whether a
defendant accused of infringing an author’s fake facts is required to have reasonably relied on the author’s fake facts as facts for factual estoppel to apply.
In deciding whether the factual estoppel doctrine applies to treat fake facts as
unprotectable facts, some courts have required a defendant to prove reliance.160
Some courts have even required defendants to show that their reliance was reasonable.161 Other courts have explicitly rejected the requirement that defendant
prove that they relied on the fake facts as facts, and have even found the factual
estoppel doctrine to apply to clearly absurd fake facts that no reasonable person
would believe were true.162
1. Reasonable Reliance Required
A handful of courts require that a defendant reasonably relied on the fake
facts as facts for the factual estoppel doctrine to apply. In Mosely v. Follett,
discussed above, the court determined that the defendant had reasonably relied
on the author’s representations that the work was factual when the defendant
wrote and published a fictional work based on a spy character and episode from
the author’s book.163 The court focused on the defendant’s reliance and found it
to be reasonable in light of the classification of the author’s work by the Library of Congress and other libraries as nonfiction, and the treatment of the
work by book reviewers as being nonfiction.164
The court in Marshall v. Yates similarly endorsed the reasonable reliance
requirement for factual estoppel. As discussed above, in Marshall, the author’s
biography of Frances Farmer, Shadowland, was released to the public as nonfiction, and all of the promotional materials and reviews of the book treated the
book as nonfiction.165 Based largely on research from Shadowland, the defendants wrote a movie script and produced a movie about Frances Farmer.166 The
author sued defendants for copyright infringement, claiming that even though
the work was largely biographical, the author had included at least eight fictionalized elements in Shadowland that the defendants had copied and used in
their movie.167 The Marshall court found reliance because there was no “suffi160
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cient showing that defendants in fact knew that these portions of the book were
fabricated by [the author].”168 The court further described the defendants’ reliance to be reasonable because Shadowland “was not so clearly incredible that
defendants should have been put on notice that portions were fictionalized.”169
The court’s statement indicated that had Shadowland been “so clearly incredible,” the defendants could not have reasonably relied on the fake facts as facts
and the factual estoppel doctrine would not apply.170
2. Reasonable Reliance Not Required
Other courts have explicitly rejected the requirement that the defendant
show reliance, finding that the defendant’s reliance that the work was factual is
not relevant to application of the factual estoppel doctrine. These courts seem
to embrace the argument that factual estoppel is triggered purely by the author’s bad behavior and not by the defendant’s reliance. In Arica Institute, Inc.
v. Palmer, the plaintiff-institute published books by its founder, Oscar Ichazo,
which provided teachings on psychological self-help.171 The Arica System,
embodied in the Arica training manuals and books, is based on the teaching that
the human body and psyche consists of nine systems.172 Those systems can become imbalanced by “ego fixations,” including indolence, resentment, flattery,
vanity, melancholy, stinginess, cowardice, planning, and vengeance.173 Arica’s
manuals and books used diagrams, including nine-point figures enclosed in a
circle called “enneagons,” to illustrate humanity’s nine ego-fixations.174 The
plaintiffs claimed to have “discovered” these ego fixations as “scientifically
verifiable ‘facts’ of the human nature,” which were based on “proven scientific
knowledge . . . provable in the laboratory and clinically,” constituting “a discovery as scientific discoveries are, with exactly the same qualifications of being verifiable and objective.”175 As of 1992, there were approximately forty
Arica training centers in the United States, South America, Europe, and Australia.176 Helen Palmer, an attendee at Ichazo’s trainings, wrote and published
her own book, The Enneagram: Understanding Yourself and the Others in Your
Life, based on the teachings of Ichazo and Arica’s manuals and books.177 Palmer’s book included Arica’s enneagrams and ego fixations and theories.178 The
Arica Institute sued Palmer for copyright infringement.179 After finding that
168
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Arica held out its ego-fixations and theories as facts, the court applied the factual estoppel doctrine to deny Arica from claiming copyright protection over
the ego-fixations, even though the court admitted that “a reasonable reader
might not believe the representation.”180 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the
fact that a reasonable person may not believe the fake facts “does not negate the
estoppel.”181
In Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the court was even clearer in its rejection of the idea that defendant’s reasonable reliance is necessary for factual
estoppel to apply. Specifically, the Houts court held that factual estoppel is
“created solely by plaintiff’s affirmative action and representation that the work
was factual.”182 In Houts, the author wrote and published the book Where
Death Delights, the story of Dr. Milton H. Helpern, chief medical examiner of
the City of New York.183 The defendants created and produced a television series, Quincy, based on the author’s book.184 The author sued the writers and
producers of the TV show Quincy, claiming that Where Death Delights is “an
amalgam of fact and fiction, and hence it is entitled to full copyright protection.”185 After finding that the author held out his book as being factual, the
court rejected the author’s argument that defendants must show reliance as a
necessary element to apply the factual estoppel doctrine.186 The court went so
far as to state that even clearly absurd stories that are “ludicrous to the average
reader” do not overcome the evidence that the author expressly held out the
work as being factual.187 In other words, defendants need not show that they
relied on the work as factual, nor do defendants need to show that their reliance
was reasonable.
Courts’ conflicting requirements for defendants to assert the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts can cause some absurd
consequences. Take, for instance, fake facts that have been publicly debunked.
If a playwright now wants to create a drama based on Greg Mortenson’s Three
Cups of Tea, would that playwright need to seek permission from Mortenson
before recreating an episode where a character is similarly captured by the Taliban? Now that the episode has been publicly debunked as fake, does it regain
its protection under copyright because no one can claim anymore to reasonably
rely on the episode as factual? For courts that require reliance to be reasonable,
how “clearly incredible” or absurd must the author’s story be for the defendant’s reliance to be considered unreasonable? For instance, the plot of the film
180
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Return of the Living Dead is clearly ridiculous to the average audience, but it is
published with the statement that “[t]he events portrayed in this film are all
true. The names are real names of real people and real organizations.”188 Have
the publishers of this film held out their work as being factual with this express
statement of fact, or should the film’s ridiculous plot—involving the dead coming back to life as bloodthirsty, flesh-eating monsters—overcome its express
statement?
C. Fake Facts Protected as Fiction
In addition to the uncertainty within decisions applying the factual estoppel
doctrine, some courts fail to recognize, refuse to apply, or reject the doctrine
altogether. For instance, in De Acosta v. Brown, the author wrote a screenplay
titled Angel in Service based on the life of Clara Barton, founder of the American Red Cross.189 Even though the screenplay was primarily based on Barton’s
life, in order to make her “biographical screen play palatable to the movie audiences of America,” the author added a number of fictional elements to her
work.190 These “heart interest[s]” included giving Barton a fictional lover, inventing a fake letter, falsifying a controversy with the school board, creating a
fictional villain, and other fake facts.191 The defendant, Beth Brown, wrote her
own biographical work about Clara Barton and published extracts from her
work in Cosmopolitan magazine’s “The Nonfiction Book Digest.”192 Brown’s
work used the author’s screenplay as a source for information and copied approximately seven fake facts the author had included in her screenplay.193 The
De Acosta court found Brown’s work to infringe the author’s screenplay because, according to the court, “original treatment of the life of a historic character, like such treatment of any material even in the public domain, is entitled to
protection against appropriation by others.”194 The court did not consider
whether the author had held out her screenplay as representing the true story of
Clara Barton, or whether Brown had reasonably believed the screenplay to be a
factual account of Barton’s life when Brown adopted it. Indeed, in light of
Brown’s use of the screenplay as a source for her own nonfiction biography
about Barton, it is likely that Brown believed the author’s work to be a true account of Barton’s life.
Another court refused to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to fake facts by
categorizing fake facts as assertions of belief rather than assertions of fact. In
Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd.,
188
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189 De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1944).
190 Id.
191 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194
Id. at 410.

Fall 2019]

TRUTH, LIES, AND COPYRIGHT

225

the author made statements that Jesus Christ dictated the script for her book, A
Course in Miracles, which was held out as a “non-sectarian, nondenominational spiritual teaching” that included “numerous psychological
terms and ideas, such as denial, projection, dissociation, and hallucination.”195
Despite being factually analogous to some of the cases described above, the
court in Penguin Books refused to find that the author held out her work as factual.196 The Penguin Books court criticized or distinguished past courts’ applications of the factual estoppel doctrine in similar spiritual cases.197 In the case
of Oliver, for instance, the Penguin Books court found Oliver’s application of
the factual estoppel doctrine to be bizarre and echoed criticism “wonder[ing]
whether the Oliver court would have invoked the same [factual estoppel] defense against Sir Arthur Conan Doyle on the grounds his ‘Sherlock Holmes’
stories are presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson.”198 The court concluded by finding the factual estoppel doctrine inapplicable in Penguin Books because the author’s representation of fact was “a claim based on faith” and much
of the book was “prescriptive rather than descriptive.”199
Similarly, in the recent Gerald Brittle v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
dispute, the court failed to recognize the factual estoppel doctrine when it denied Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss.200 Gerald Brittle published the book
The Demonologist in 1980 about the adventures of paranormal investigators Ed
and Lorraine Warren.201 The Warrens “investigat[ed] hauntings and work[ed]
with church officials to exorcise demons.”202 One of their most infamous adventures was their 1972 investigation of a haunting at the West Point military
academy.203 The Demonologist was marketed as and purported to be a true account of events in the Warrens’ lives.204 Each chapter of The Demonologist
highlighted an episode of the Warrens’ paranormal investigations, and the book
included real-life photographs by the Warrens and dialogue “supported by firstperson testimony by witnesses, and/or tape recordings the Warrens made on the
195
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scene while phenomena were in progress.”205 Brittle included statements in the
preface of The Demonologist that “all the information presented in this book is
true,” “[t]hese are real cases that happened to real people,” “[g]reat care has
been taken . . . to include only those cases in the Warrens’ files that were witnessed by ordained clergymen and exorcists,” and “[i]t should . . . be stressed
that there is no exaggeration . . . [in] this book.”206
After Warner Brothers released the blockbuster movie, The Conjuring,
based on the Warrens’ paranormal investigations, Brittle sued Warner Brothers
for copyright infringement.207 Warner Brothers moved to dismiss Brittle’s
complaint on the ground that any similarities between Brittle’s book and The
Conjuring movie were based on facts, which were unprotected by copyright.208
Warner Brothers argued that for decades Brittle told the public that the factual
details in his book were true, and that these unprotectable “facts” cannot form
the basis of a copyright infringement claim.209 The court, however, denied
Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss because it “decline[d] the parties’ invitation to wade into the truth or falsity of the Warrens’ paranormal escapades . . .
at this stage of the case. This type of analysis, which b[ore] on evidence presented and factual determinations, [was] better suited for summary judgment or
trial.”210 In other words, instead of looking at whether Brittle had held out his
accounts of the Warrens’ paranormal investigations in The Demonologist as
factual and, therefore, possibly unprotectable under the factual estoppel doctrine, the court’s opinion indicated that it would eventually need to determine
the truth or falsity of the facts presented in The Demonologist. Under the factual estoppel doctrine, however, the court should never need to “wade into the
truth or falsity” of the events in The Demonologist; the court would merely
need to determine whether Brittle was factually estopped from asserting that his
work was fiction and entitled to a higher level of copyright protection.
Courts and litigants do not always recognize the factual estoppel doctrine,
or the idea that fake facts—when held out by their author as facts—may not deserve the same level of copyright protection as fiction. If courts are not willing
to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts,
authors that wish to rely on factual works would need to take extra care and due
diligence to ensure that the works they rely upon are truly and one-hundred
percent factual. This inability to rely on the factual estoppel doctrine creates
uncertainty, inefficiency, and additional burdens for authors who wish to use
other authors’ factual assertions to create secondary works.
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IV. JUSTIFYING FACTUAL ESTOPPEL
If fake facts are created, and copyright is designed to encourage and promote creativity, why not protect fake facts as fiction under copyright law?
Copyright is traditionally justified in the U.S. under a utilitarian theory: copyright incentivizes authors to create expressive works that benefit society.211 If
authors cannot rely on the exclusivity to their works granted to them by copyright law, the assumption is that they may not create expressive works because
they will have no way of preventing others from copying them. In terms of fake
facts, do the justifications for copyright prevail over denying protection to fake
facts under the factual estoppel doctrine?
A. Benefits of Factual Estoppel
There are many benefits to applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat
fake facts as unprotectable facts, including promoting efficiency, fairness, and
production of socially valuable secondary works. Authors of fake facts should
not be able to benefit from their deceptions; and the factual estoppel doctrine, if
standardized, could marginally deter authors from creating fake facts in the first
place. Further, factual estoppel promotes efficiency by allowing creators to rely
on authors’ representations instead of expending time and energy attempting to
distinguish fake facts from facts; it protects later creators from copyright liability when they rely on works that authors hold out as being factual, and it spares
courts the effort of attempting to distinguish protected fiction from unprotected
fact.
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Efficiency and Production of
Socially Valuable Works
One of the most important reasons for excluding fake facts from copyright
protection is that such exclusion promotes efficiency and dissemination of public knowledge by allowing later creators to rely on factual works to create secondary works. Without the factual estoppel doctrine, authors who wish to rely
on prior works for research or creation would need to “engage in difficult and
often irresolvable empirical inquiries in order to determine copyrightability.”212
As the court in Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co. noted,
To treat ‘false’ facts interspersed among actual facts and represented as actual
facts as fiction would mean that no one could ever reproduce or copy actual
facts without risk of reproducing a false fact and thereby violating a copyright. If
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such were the law, information could never be reproduced or widely disseminated.213

If later creators are required to expend the time and labor to parse fiction
from fact and can never be certain that they are copying only unprotectable
facts, those later creators may be less inclined to create secondary works in the
first place. This could “unduly chill authors seeking to write about historical
issues or events,” and it could “inhibit the production of socially valuable secondary works,” and diminish rather than promote public knowledge.214 The factual estoppel doctrine, which treats fake facts as unprotectable facts, spares later creators from having to expend the extraneous labor of sifting through a
supposed factual work to distinguish protected fiction from unprotected fact.
The doctrine also removes the uncertainty that a later creator may inadvertently
infringe an author’s copyright if certain factual accounts in the author’s work
later turn out to be fake.
2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Promotes Judicial Efficiency
In addition to making it more efficient for secondary creators to use factual
works, the factual estoppel doctrine also promotes judicial efficiency by allowing courts to dispose of copyright infringement cases without having to undertake complex analyses parsing protected fiction from unprotected fact. For instance, as discussed above, Brittle alleged in Gerald Brittle v. Warner Bros.
Entertainment, Inc. that Warner Brothers’ movie The Conjuring infringed Brittle’s copyright in his nonfiction book, The Demonologist.215 Like The Conjuring, The Demonologist tells the “true” stories of the Warrens’ paranormal investigations of hauntings and their encounters with ghosts.216 The court denied
Warner Brothers’ motion to dismiss Brittle’s copyright infringement claim because the court was not yet ready to engage in the difficult and fact-intensive
inquiry into “the truth or falsity of the Warrens’ paranormal escapades.”217
However, if the court applied the factual estoppel doctrine, the court would
never need to engage in the difficult task of “wad[ing] into the truth or falsity”218 of the events described in Brittle’s book; it would merely need to determine whether the factual estoppel doctrine applied to treat Brittle’s entire work
as a factual work, limiting the copyright protection to only original expression
213
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or arrangement. At the same time, the factual estoppel doctrine will also prevent courts from having to wade into the difficult task of distinguishing truth
from falsity in claims involving spiritual or religious texts. Instead of requiring
judges to adjudicate whether specific facts—such as divine revelations or religious facts—are true, which could trigger Establishment Clause concerns,219
courts can instead apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat the entire religious
text as a factual work. This would limit copyright protection to only original
expression or arrangement, if any, of the “facts.”
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine May Marginally Deter Creation of
Fake Facts
Like unclean hands, the factual estoppel doctrine might even “increase[]
the cost of making false representations of fact and therefore may marginally
deter such statements.”220 Fake facts, when held out as true, are generally bad
for society. We read the news or nonfiction works in order to be informed and
to learn about or find meaning in the world. Fake facts create a false record and
can contribute to the distortion of history. Fake facts could also be adopted and
repeated and recited as true, resulting in falsification of the historical record.
Therefore, deterring authors from creating fake facts “is a positive consequence, for both deontological and utilitarian reasons.”221 Instead of rewarding
authors with copyright protection of their created fake facts, the law should deter this type of behavior and any doctrine that even marginally deters fake
facts’ creation should be considered. In spite of this endorsement, the factual
estoppel doctrine’s ability to deter authors from creating fake facts is unclear.
Because application of the factual estoppel doctrine merely grants fake facts the
same scope of copyright protection they would have enjoyed had they been
facts, it is unclear how excluding fake facts from copyright law deters authors
from creating fake facts because those authors are not losing any protection
they otherwise would have had.
4. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Is Fair
The factual estoppel doctrine is fair and, like unclean hands, enforces “equity and good morals.”222 Authors should not be able to reap the benefits of
marketing their work as factual, but turn around and declare it as fiction in order to benefit again in a copyright infringement suit. In other words, “[t]here is
no unfairness in holding people to their word.”223 In Davies v. Bowes, discussed
above, the court justified applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat Da219
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vies’s fake news article as factual because “it is a matter of morals that he who
puts forth a thing as verity shall not be heard to allege for profit that it is fiction.”224 Specifically, “because [the story] was printed as news; it was presented to the public as matter of fact and not of fiction; the readers of the Sun were
invited to believe it,” Davies, therefore, should not be able to turn around and
claim the story to be fiction in order to profit from the defendant’s use of his
story.225 This result—preventing an author from benefitting from claiming their
work to be true and claiming their work to be fake—is fair.
5. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Upholds Reasonable Expectations
The factual estoppel doctrine also upholds parties’ reasonable expectations
and protects defendants that rely on authors’ representations of fact. Once factual estoppel is established, an author’s fake facts are treated as facts, limiting
the protectable elements of the author’s work to the expression or original arrangement of those facts.226 This significantly decreases the chance that an author, who holds out fiction as fact, will succeed in a copyright infringement
case unless the defendant wholesale appropriated the expression or arrangement of those fake facts. The author’s expectations are met in this situation because copyright does not protect facts, so authors that hold fake facts out as
facts should not reasonably expect copyright to protect those facts. Similarly, a
defendant’s expectations are also upheld because they expected to be able to
use facts without incurring copyright liability. On the other hand, where a defendant wholesale appropriates an author’s work, including the author’s original expression and arrangement, that defendant could still be liable for copyright infringement. For instance, even though it becomes very difficult to
protect a work under copyright once a court applies the factual estoppel doctrine, it is not impossible. In Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, the Urantia
Foundation held out the plot of its spiritual guidebooks as having been authored
by spiritual beings.227 Maaherra copied verbatim the entire Urantia Book, including the selection and arrangement of the revelations within the Book, and
distributed it on computer disks.228 The court explained that, while the divine
revelations in the Book were divine “facts” that “would be analogous to a
‘fact,’ and which of course would not be copyrightable[,]” in this case, Maaherra copied more than just the facts—but also the original expression, selection,
and arrangement of those facts, which copyright law protects.229
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B. Consequences of Factual Estoppel
At the same time, applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts
as unprotectable facts could have unintended consequences, including increasing the dissemination of fake facts, stripping away copyright protection of fictional works that rely on facts for entertainment, and denying protection to
original expression or arrangement of fake facts.
1. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could, Theoretically, Increase
Dissemination of Fake Facts
Some commentators express concern that factual estoppel may increase the
dissemination of fake facts.230 If fake facts are not protected by copyright, then
subsequent authors may repeat an author’s fake facts without incurring copyright liability. Some argue that this could increase the dissemination of fake
facts as well as multiply the sources reciting those fake facts.231 This result is
contrary to copyright’s goal of excluding facts, which—according to some—is
to “provide consumers with accurate information at the lowest cost.”232 This
was a concern expressed by the court in Belcher v. Tarbox regarding denying
copyright to fraudulent material; the court in that case stated that “[c]opyright
protection restricts permissible publication. We fail to see what public policy
would be served by eliminating this restriction in the case of fraudulent matter
and permitting it to be reprinted and circulated freely.”233 Analogizing the
Belcher court’s concern to denying copyright to fake facts would mean that to
treat fake facts as unprotectable facts could permit those fake facts to be reprinted and circulated freely, which would not serve public policy. While treating fake facts as unprotectable facts could theoretically allow the duplication or
increase the dissemination of fake facts, the solution to this concern is not to
protect fake facts under copyright law. Protecting fake facts under copyright
only serves to punish gullible defendants that rely on authors holding out their
works as factual. It also allows authors, whose intent was to dupe the public
and benefit from claiming that their works are factual, to benefit again in infringement litigation against unwitting defendants. This result is not only unfair
but would also create uncertainty that later authors may face copyright liability
for inadvertently using fake facts in their secondary works, and potentially chill
the production of these socially valuable secondary works.
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See II PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.4 (3d ed. 2008); Cotter, supra
note 214, at 348.
231 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 230, § 10.4 (stating “[t]o excuse the defendant’s taking on the
ground that the plaintiff’s work generally represents itself as factual removes any incentive
for the defendant to check the putative facts against other sources and multiplies the sources
of inaccurate information available to consumers.”).
232 Id.
233
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973).
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2. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Negatively Affect Production of
Certain Genres of Works
Some commentators are concerned that applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts could negatively affect production
of certain genres or categories of works. For instance, when courts extend the
factual estoppel doctrine to deem “a work ‘factual’ regardless of the author’s
intentions[,]” they may negatively affect semi-fabricated works “that (fictitiously) claim to tell a true story” for entertainment purposes.234 The court in
Garman v. Sterling Publishing Co. expressed the concern that the factual estoppel doctrine “could hinder the goals of the Copyright Act by providing a disincentive to produce certain works,” citing as an example “an author of historical fiction might jeopardize her copyright if she attributed fictitious dialogue to
historical characters.”235
Consider The Blair Witch Project’s innovative marketing scheme, where
producers portrayed the events in their found-footage film as being real in various online sources.236 By marketing the work as a true story for the purpose of
entertainment, a court could apply the factual estoppel doctrine to exclude the
plot or events in the movie from copyright protection. Taking this argument to
the extreme could mean works such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock
Holmes series, written from the perspective of fictional-biographer Dr. Watson,237 or books like Jim Fergus’s One Thousand White Women: The Journals
of May Dodd, written as the discovered journal of fictional character May
Dodd, could be subject to the factual estoppel doctrine and not protected by
copyright.238 Indeed, it would be contrary to copyright policy if “the result of
applying copyright estoppel in the case of a literary or artistic hoax . . . could
overdeter legitimate behavior.”239
These concerns, while legitimate, are avoidable. If courts apply factual estoppel consistently using the framework laid out at the end of this Article, and
authors take the precautionary measure of including disclaimers about the fictional aspects of their works, those works are not likely to be subject to the factual estoppel doctrine. Indeed, because the new framework discussed below
takes into consideration objective evidence regarding an author’s intent, fictional works written like nonfiction in order to entertain would not likely be
234

Kellogg, supra note 38, at 562; see also Cotter, supra note 214, at 348 (stating “an expansive application of [factual] estoppel might decrease the first author’s expected reward
from producing genres such as historical fiction and fiction that purports to be a factual account written by one of the characters.”).
235 Garman v. Sterling Publ’g. Co., No. C-91-0882 SBA (ENE), 1992 WL 12561293, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1992).
236 See Davidson, supra note 58.
237 Nimmer mentioned this possibility in his criticism of the Oliver v. Saint German Foundation decision, where he asks, “[o]ne wonders whether that court would have invoked the
same defense against Sir Arthur Conan Doyle on the grounds his Sherlock Holmes stories are
presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson.” 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83, § 2.11.
238 See id.
239
Cotter, supra note 214, at 352.
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subject to the factual estoppel doctrine unless they are clearly held out as nonfiction and have the potential to deceive more than a de minimis portion of the
public.
3. The Factual Estoppel Doctrine Could Deny Protection to Original
Arrangement or Expression of Fake Facts
One commentator claims that once a court finds that factual estoppel applies, “the work is generally not protected at all . . . because the party to whom
factual estoppel applies never will have made the alternative argument that its
work was factual. If it had, then factual estoppel would not apply in the first instance.”240 This would mean that even if a defendant wholesale copied the author’s work, once a court determines that factual estoppel applies, that defendant is not likely to be liable for infringement of the plaintiff’s original
expression or arrangement of fake facts. While most cases applying the factual
estoppel doctrine do indeed result in findings of noninfringement, this is not
always the case.
For instance, in Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, discussed above, the
court applied the factual estoppel doctrine to find that the individual revelations
recited in the plaintiff’s spiritual guides were not protectable under copyright
law, but that the defendant had infringed the original selection and arrangement
of those revelations, which was protected as a copyrightable compilation.241
Similarly, in Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., the court denied copyright protection of the “obscure and erroneous listings” the plaintiff
planted in its map under the factual estoppel doctrine.242 However, even treating those fake facts as facts, the court in Nester acknowledged that the author’s
“list of numbers in its street address guide may be copyrightable not because
the statements are fictional but because of the originality in selecting and assigning them to particular cross streets.”243 The court in Garman v. Sterling
Publishing Co., Inc. came to the same conclusion where the author and publisher of the book Gem Elixirs and Vibrational Healing sued the defendantauthor of Crystal Workbook for copyright infringement.244 The court admitted
that “[a]lthough the ‘factual’ contentions advanced in both Gem Elixirs and
Crystal Workbook are undoubtedly fanciful, they are still represented as facts.
As such, subsequent researchers in this field of pseudoscience had a right to
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David A. Simon, In Search of (Maintaining) the Truth: The Use of Copyright Law by
Religious Organizations, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 355, 408, 408 n.320 (2010).
241 Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1997).
242 Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp 729, 731, 733
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
243 Id. at 733. Specifically, the court held that “Nester’s Map used sufficient creativity in
implementing a plan to locate addresses along major streets to qualify this section of Nester’s guide as copyrightable.” Id.
244 Garman v. Sterling Publ’g. Co., Inc., No. C-91-0882 SBA (ENE), 1992 WL 12561293,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1992).
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make use of the facts and ideas contained in plaintiff’s work.”245 The court,
however, refused to grant the defendant summary judgment because the author
showed “sufficient evidence of copying of expressive elements of both the
prose and the charts” from the author’s book.246 Therefore, even though application of the factual estoppel doctrine makes finding copyright infringement
significantly more difficult, it is not a blanket defense for infringing defendants.
While there could be unintended consequences from applying the factual
estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as facts, those consequences are minimal
when compared with the efficiency, fairness, and social benefits in allowing
later creators to rely on “facts” in their secondary works without worrying that
those facts may be protected by copyright.247 On balance, the public interests of
efficiency, fairness, and promoting production of socially valuable secondary
works are better served when courts apply factual estoppel to treat fake facts as
unprotectable facts in copyright infringement cases involving copying of fake
facts.
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE FACTUAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
Having established that the public’s interest is better served when courts
apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts, the
next issue is how courts should determine when to apply the factual estoppel
doctrine. The inconsistent treatment of fake facts under copyright law and the
conflicting recognition and application of the factual estoppel doctrine can
cause uncertainty to courts, litigants, authors, and the creative industry. Future
authors who want to rely on factual works for research or inspiration can never
be certain that they will not face liability for copying protected fiction, and litigants and courts waste valuable time and energy attempting to prove and parse
245

Id. at *4.
Id. at *7.
247 Some may argue that fair use would allow authors to use fake facts in their secondary
works without facing copyright liability. This argument, however, falls short. As a preliminary matter, by applying the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake facts as unprotectable
facts, litigants never have to argue fair use, because facts are not protectable subject matter
under copyright law. Additionally, even though fair use allows a follow-on creator to reproduce works for purposes such as criticism, comments, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
or research, it may not allow an author to reproduce protected fictional works for purposes
such as creating a derivative fictional work. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592
WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (the creation of a sequel with
characters developed in Rocky I, II, and III infringes the copyright of those original works).
Indeed, the fair use doctrine may not even allow an author to produce a secondary encyclopedic work based on a protected fictional work. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol
Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135, 146 (2d Cir. 1998) (defendant’s trivia book about the
Seinfeld television series was not fair use); Warner Bros., Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 524, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant’s encyclopedia of Harry Potter fantasy
novel series was not a fair use of the author’s works). If the underlying works in all three of
these above examples were nonfiction instead of fiction, the defendants’ creation of a derivative creative sequel, an encyclopedia, and a trivial book based on facts would likely not have
been infringing.
246
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fiction from fact. Based on past case law and incorporating elements from other
areas of the law, including false advertising, trademark infringement, and the
equitable estoppel defense, this Part recommends a new practical and consistent
framework for courts going forward to determine when the factual estoppel
doctrine should apply to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts in copyright infringement cases.
When an author files a copyright infringement action accusing a defendant
of copying fake facts or fictionalized elements of a nonfiction work, and the
court determines that the factual estoppel doctrine applies, the court should
treat the plaintiff’s entire work as a factual work, limiting the protectable elements of the work to the expression or unique and original arrangement of the
work. This significantly decreases the chances that a plaintiff will succeed in a
copyright infringement claim unless the defendant wholesale appropriated the
original expression or arrangement of fake facts. In order determine whether
the factual estoppel doctrine should apply, the court should consider the following three questions: (1) whether the author held out fake facts as fact; (2)
whether the author intended for the public to rely on their work as fact; and (3)
whether the public could believe that the work is factual. If the answer to all
three of these questions is yes, then the factual estoppel doctrine should apply
to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts under copyright law.
A. The Author Held Out Fake Facts as Facts
When a court is faced with an author attempting to assert copyright protection over fake facts, the first step should be to determine whether the author
represented those fake facts as facts. This is an important inquiry that examines
how an author held the work out to the public, including the author’s express
representations, the style and source of the work, and whether or what types of
disclaimers the author included with the work. If the weight of the evidence
shows that the author held out fake facts as facts, then the author is more likely
to be factually estopped from claiming the fake facts were fiction entitled to
copyright protection.
One factor to consider under this first question is whether the author made
express representations that fake facts were facts or that their work was nonfiction. These express representations could be within the work, on the work’s
cover, in the preface or book jacket of the work, as the official library’s category, or in the author’s statements. For instance, if the author claimed that the
work was nonfiction, included statements in the preface or book jacket that the
work is a true story or consisted of scientifically verifiable fact, allowed book
reviews to claim that the work was nonfiction without issuing corrections, categorized the work as nonfiction in marketing and sale channels or with the Library of Congress, or made statements of the work’s truth in interviews or media appearances, then this first question most likely leans in favor of the fake
facts having been held out as facts.
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Another factor to consider under this first question is the work’s content,
style, and source, and whether the work was written like nonfiction or published in a source the public would rely on as factual. For instance, does the
work read like nonfiction, is it published as a journalistic, news-like source, or
in a source that the public would rely on to be factual? Even where authors do
not expressly represent that their work is factual, if the work reads like nonfiction and is included in a source that the public would generally assume to be
factual—such as a dictionary, encyclopedia, map, or news section of the newspaper—then this first question weighs toward finding that the author held out
fake facts as facts. This factor alone cannot prove that the author represented
the work as nonfiction because that could prevent highly creative and obviously
fictional works, including news satire, found-footage films, and historic fiction,
from copyright protection. However, it is one factor that courts should consider
in conjunction with the author’s statements and explicit representations.
Whether the work included a disclaimer also helps determine whether the
fake facts were held out as facts. For instance, did the author include disclaimers that the work was merely “inspired by a true story” or is “fiction”? These
statements represent that the work is not entirely true, may include fictionalized
elements, or is completely made-up. Similarly, in works where content and
style are written like nonfiction, the inclusion of disclaimers such as the Borowitz Report’s “[n]ot the news,” or the common disclaimer in books that “this is
a work of fiction. Any names or characters, businesses or places, events or incidents, are entirely fictitious,” are also important considerations that the work
was not held out as true. In fact, the existence of a clear disclaimer that the
work is fiction within the work, such as being categorized as “fiction” in a
book’s jacket, should outweigh any consideration of a work’s content or style.
B. The Author Intended the Public to Rely on Fake Facts as Facts
The second question that a court should ask is whether authors intended for
the public to rely on their fake facts as facts. For instance, did the author intend
to deceive or mislead the audience? Did they intend for their audience to rely
upon their representations that their work was factual? Or was the author’s intent merely to entertain and not for others to rely on the work as fact? Actual
evidence of the author’s intent, the work’s genre, and the value consumers
place on the author’s work can be objective evidence to support an author’s intent to deceive. This question draws from a number of other areas of the law,
including the classic equitable estoppel defense in copyright infringement
claims in which courts require “the plaintiff must intend that its conduct shall
be acted on or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so
intended.”248 It also finds support in trademark law, which considers the defendant’s intent to confuse consumers as one factor in a likelihood of confusion
analysis; and in the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, which requires a show248

4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.07[A] (citing Hampton v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960)).
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ing that the actor “intends or has reason to expect [persons] to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.”249 Requiring a showing of
intent to deceive also helps address concerns that the factual estoppel doctrine
will chill works in the found-footage, news satire, historic fiction genres, and
concerns that courts might extend the factual estoppel doctrine to deem “a work
‘factual’ regardless of the author’s intentions.”250 In the factual estoppel context, the stronger the evidence that the author intended the public to rely on
their work as factual, the more likely the factual estoppel doctrine should apply
to exclude fake facts from copyright protection.
Even though it can be difficult to find evidence of an author’s intent, there
are certain factors that can help serve as objective evidence that the author intended the public to rely on fake facts as facts. As a preliminary matter, the
genre of the author’s work may help determine whether the author intended to
deceive or mislead the public. Specifically, authors that include fake facts in
certain genres—such as news, biographical or historical works, maps, encyclopedias, telephone directories, dictionaries, religious or spiritual texts—are more
likely to have the intent to deceive than authors that include fake facts in genres
such as historical fiction, found-footage, or news satire. Therefore, courts may
take into consideration the genre in which the fake facts appear in order to help
discern the author’s intent. Authors hold out fake facts as facts for different reasons. It is in society’s interest to deny copyright protection of fake fakes that
are held out as true to deceive the public into relying on those fake facts. As
explained above, fake facts that deceive are bad for society because they distort
history, falsely shape our views of society, and provide misinformation for posterity. On the other hand, it is in society’s interest to continue encouraging innovative and novel forms of literary or entertainment works that are not intended to deceive, but rather, are intended to entertain. Unlike fake facts that
deceive, works that entertain—such as those in the historical fiction, foundfootage, satirical news genres—benefit society similarly to a good novel,
blockbuster movie, or creative painting. Under this consideration, the work’s
genre can help determine the author’s intention in holding out fake facts as true.
Another factor to determine the author’s intent is whether audiences primarily valued the author’s work because they believed it to be factual. The
more evidence that the author’s work was valued because it was factual, the
more likely the author intended for the public to rely on the fake facts as facts.
This consideration draws from false advertising law where a defendant’s misrepresentation may be found to be material “in the sense that it would have
some effect on consumers’ purchasing decisions.”251 Here, if consumers would
only value the author’s work because it is nonfiction, then the author is more
likely to have intended to deceive, and this second question would lean in favor
of applying the factual estoppel doctrine to deny copyright. One commentator
249

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
Kellogg, supra note 38, at 562.
251 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 27:35 (5th ed. 2019).
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acknowledged that application of the factual estoppel doctrine “makes sense
because the real difference between factual and fictional material is not the extent to which it is true, but the reason the material is valued by consumers.”252
Specifically, “material can be valued as factual, because it is considered correct, even if it is actually false. By the same token, material can be valued as
fictional—for example, because it is entertaining—even if it turns out to be
true.”253 Consumers value fact differently from fiction—they “value factual
material as a guide for their action and in order to satisfy their curiosity about
what the world is like. The reasons for their valuing fictional material are more
aesthetic and recreational.”254 Found-footage films such as The Blair Witch
Project, or news satire such as The Borowitz Report, are valued for their entertainment quality. Encyclopedias or the news are valued because they purport to
tell the truth. If an author’s work is primarily valued because it is purportedly
true, then a court may find that the author is more likely to have intended to deceive the public into relying on the work as fact.
C. The Public Could Believe that the Work is Factual
The final question that a court should ask is whether the public could believe the work is factual. Specifically, if more than a de minimis portion of the
public255 could believe that the author’s work is factual, then the factual estoppel doctrine is more likely to apply. In order to answer this third question, a
court should consider whether a defendant in a copyright infringement case was
actually deceived into believing the work was true, whether the fake facts are
so absurd that no reasonable person would be deceived, whether the work is
one that most people would recognize as fiction, and whether the public was in
fact deceived into believing that the work was nonfiction. This third question
finds support in false advertising law, which requires a claimant to prove that a
defendant’s representations of fact either deceived or had the potential to deceive consumers.256
One factor that could help answer this last question is whether the defendant relied on the author’s representations that the work was factual. As discussed above, a handful of courts required a defendant to show actual reliance
on the author’s representations that the work was true in order to apply the fac-
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Green, supra note 80, at 945.
Id.
254 Id. at 945–46.
255 I have refrained from setting the bar too high because, as Cotter explains, “[i]f a small
but nonetheless significant number of readers will likely rely upon the author’s presentation
of the work as factual, the social interest in allowing these readers to use these ‘facts’ without fear of copyright liability may be substantial.” Cotter, supra note 214, at 350.
256 Malla Pollack, Suing for False Advertising Under Federal Lanham Act, 111 AM. JUR.
Trials 303 § 18 (2009) (“Proof that a significant number of potential customers were deceived satisfies this element. However, likelihood of deception of a significant number of
relevant persons is sufficient.”).
253
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tual estoppel doctrine.257 Reliance is a typical element required to assert a classic equitable estoppel defense both in copyright infringement cases and other
areas of the law. For instance, in order to assert the defense of equitable estoppel to copyright infringement, “the defendant must be ignorant of the true facts
. . . [and] must rely on the plaintiff’s conduct to its injury.”258 Similarly, to establish equitable estoppel in enforcing an oral contract for the sale of real property, the parties must show that they acted to their detriment in reasonable reliance on the other’s oral promise.259 However, for factual estoppel to apply,
defendant’s reliance should be considered as only one piece of evidence to support the argument that the public could believe that the work is factual. It
should not be considered a dispositive issue on its own. On the one hand, the
factual estoppel doctrine should not apply just because the defendant confused
fiction with fact. For instance, just because one congressman might have believed the Onion article that “Planned Parenthood Opens $8 Billion Abortionplex” is not enough to support a claim that the public could believe it to be
true.260 Defendant’s own reliance, therefore, should only be one consideration.
On the other hand, defendants should still be able to assert factual estoppel
even if they cannot show that they relied on the author’s work as factual. If a
defendant’s own reasonable reliance were a necessary element for factual estoppel, fake facts could technically regain their protection as fiction under copyright law once they are debunked. For instance, now that Pizzagate has been
debunked as fake, a movie producer who wants to use the plot to produce a fictional comedy would not be able to show reasonable reliance and would need
to seek permission to use the fake plot of that fake news article.261 By eliminating the strict requirement of reasonable reliance, authors are not able to benefit
from their fake facts either now or in the future.
Regardless, if defendants can show evidence that they reasonably relied on
the work as factual, it could help prove that the public could believe the fake
facts. For instance, the genre of the defendant’s secondary work—(i.e., whether
the defendant’ work is fiction vs. nonfiction)—can serve as objective evidence
that the defendant genuinely believed the author’s fake facts were facts. In De
Acosta v. Brown, discussed above, the defendant incorporated the fake facts
from the plaintiff’s screenplay about Clara Barton in a “nonfiction” biographical essay the defendant wrote and published.262 The fact that the defendant
257

See supra Section III.B.1.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.07[A].
259 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
260 Dino Grandoni, Congressman Falls for the Onion’s Planned Parenthood ‘Abortionplex’
Story, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/cong
ressman-falls-months-old-onion-story-about-planned-parenthood-abortionplex/332189/
[https://perma.cc/YLA6-MVDN].
261 While the author meant for this to be a hypothetical, it looks like it is not far from reality.
See Richard Whittaker, First Trailer for Austin Conspiracy Comedy Duncan, AUSTIN
CHRON. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/screens/2019-02-01/first-tr
ailer-for-austin-conspiracy-comedy-duncan/ [https://perma.cc/DDU6-EYHX].
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Supra Section III.C.
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used the screenplay as a source for her own nonfiction biography about Barton
seemed to support that the defendant believed the plaintiff’s work to be a true
account of Barton’s life. This could help demonstrate that more than a de minimis portion of the public could believe that the plaintiff’s screenplay was a
true account of Barton’s life.
Some authors have argued that a defendant who relied on the author’s work
to produce a secondary work that is fiction rather than nonfiction should not be
able to rely on the factual estoppel doctrine. For instance, in Mosley v. Follett,
the plaintiff argued that that factual estoppel should not apply because the defendant’s novel—which relied upon Mosley’s The Cat and the Mice—was fictional and not a biographical or nonfiction work.263 As discussed above, if the
defendant’s secondary work was nonfiction, that could potentially support that
defendant believed the fake facts to be true, because the defendant incorporated
them into their own nonfiction work. However, the opposite is not true. In other
words, the fact that the defendant’s work was fiction instead of nonfiction
should not weigh against factual estoppel. As described above, once a court determines that the factual estoppel should apply to fake facts, those fake facts are
treated as facts and offered the same limited copyright protection as facts. Anyone can draw upon facts in order to create secondary works, including to create
secondary factual works or fictional works. As the court in Mosley stated,
“[t]he policy underlying the rule that history, like ideas, cannot be copyrighted
applies even where the second work incorporates the factual material into a fictional ‘thriller.’ ”264 Many popular historical fiction novels draw upon factual
locations and historical events for dramatic background. Authors of fiction
should be afforded the same opportunity as nonfiction authors to rely on the
factual estoppel doctrine when sued for copyright infringement of fake facts.
The incredibility of the fake facts also helps courts determine whether the
public could believe the fake facts were facts. This inquiry is similar to the
puffing defense in false advertising law, where grossly exaggerated advertising
claims that no reasonable buyer would believe was true, or silly and unbelievable print and television advertising, are mere puffery not actionable under false
advertising.265 In past factual estoppel case law, courts have considered whether
fake facts are “so clearly incredible” that a defendant should be put on notice
that the facts were fake.266 In other words, if the fake facts are so absurd and
unbelievable that no reasonable person would believe them to be true, those
courts indicated that the factual estoppel doctrine could not apply, and the fake
facts would be protected by copyright as fiction.267 The absurdity of the fake
facts should be one factor to help determine whether the public could believe
263

Mosley v. Follett, No. 80 Civ. 5628, 1980 WL 1171, at *1, *5 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
1980).
264 Id. at *5 n.15.
265 MCCARTHY, supra note 251, § 27:38.
266 Marshall v. Yates, No. CV-81-1850-MML, 1983 WL 1148, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
1983).
267
See id. at *3, *3 n.3.
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the work to be true, but should not completely negate application of the factual
estoppel doctrine. Whether fake facts are unbelievable is such a subjective
analysis that courts could find themselves in dangerous territory when they
judge, for instance, whether statements of spiritual encounters, divine interventions, creation stories, or other similar spiritual or religious facts are absurd or
clearly incredible. That being said, the incredibility of the fake facts should be
one factor to consider, especially when it is helpful to balance other evidence
supporting the factual estoppel doctrine. For instance, the movie Return of the
Living Dead featured the statement that “[t]he events portrayed in this film are
all true. The names are real names of real people and real organizations.”268
This statement could support a finding for factual estoppel under the first question discussed above—that the author represented the work as factual. Nevertheless, the incredibility of the plot of the movie, the obviously fake events portrayed in the movie, and the fact that most people would recognize the horror
film as being fiction, should help to balance out the weight of evidence supporting factual estoppel. Just as courts consider clearly over-the-top statements to
be puffery in false advertising claims, so too should courts consider the incredibility of the fake facts to determine whether the public could believe that the
author’s work was factual.
Finally, actual evidence of the public believing the work to be true would
help demonstrate that the public could believe the work to be factual. This
could be supported by actual evidence of public deception, such as book reviews or commentary by third parties, or survey evidence of public deception.
For instance, Oprah Winfrey’s public endorsement and later rebuke of Frey and
his book A Million Little Pieces, explaining how Winfrey felt “duped” and how
Frey “betrayed millions of readers,” could be used to support that the public
could be deceived.269 Similar to proving the actual confusion factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis in trademark infringement claims, actual confusion
evidence or survey evidence is not required for a court to apply the factual estoppel doctrine to fake facts, but is helpful evidence to show that more than a
de minimis portion of the public could believe the fake facts to be true.
D. Balancing the Evidence Supporting Factual Estoppel
In order to determine whether the factual estoppel doctrine should apply to
treat fake facts as facts in a copyright infringement case, the court should balance and weigh the evidence supporting the three questions set forth above. For
instance, if there is strong evidence showing that the author held out a work as
being true, less evidence is needed to support that the author intended for the
public to rely on the work as true or that the public could believe the work to be
true. Similarly, if there is only slight evidence showing that the author held out
the work as true, then there is a heavier burden to prove that the author intended
268

All Persons Fictitious Disclaimer, supra note 188 (quoting RETURN OF THE LIVING DEAD
(MGM 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269
Wyatt, supra note 32.
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for the public to rely on the work as fact and that the public could believe the
work was factual. This new test prevents authors from protecting fake facts in
news articles, historical or biographical books, encyclopedias and other
knowledge repositories, and religious or spiritual texts, but allows authors of
fake facts in news satire, found-footage films, historical fiction, and other
works to fictitiously claim to tell a true story for entertainment purposes to
maintain their copyright protection. If the court finds that the weight of the evidence supports that (1) the author held out fake facts as fact; (2) intending for
the public to rely on the work as fact; and (3) the public could believe that the
work is factual, the court should apply the factual estoppel doctrine to treat fake
facts as unprotectable facts under copyright law. Once a court applies factual
estoppel in a copyright infringement claim, the court need only determine
whether the author’s expression or arrangement of those facts were original
enough to warrant copyright protection, and whether the defendant copied the
author’s original arrangement or expression of their facts. Because copyright
for compilations or expressions of facts is thin, this creates a much heavier burden for an author to prove infringement. A defendant, however, can still be liable for copyright infringement of fake facts if that defendant wholesale appropriated the author’s work.
CONCLUSION
Fake facts can be damaging to society and the historical record, especially
where they are held out as true by an author, with the intent that the public rely
on them as facts, if more than a de minimis portion of the public could believe
that they are true. While facts are not protected by copyright because they do
not meet copyright’s originality standard, fake facts—which are created by an
author and often original—technically do meet copyright’s originality standard.
These fake facts, however, should not be protected by copyright law, and the
public’s interest in efficiency, fairness, and promotion of socially valuable
works justifies denying copyright protection to fake facts. The new factual estoppel doctrine framework proposed in this Article effectively and efficiently
allows a court to treat fake facts as unprotectable facts under copyright where
the author held out fake facts as facts, with the intent that the public rely on the
fake facts as facts, and where the public could believe that the fake facts were
true. Once a court finds factual estoppel, the author’s fake facts are treated like
facts under copyright law, allowing later authors and the public to freely use
those fake facts without incurring copyright liability. This result is not only fair,
but also supports the policy and justifications for copyright law.

